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 A Comparative Analysis of the Chinese and 
Indian FDI Regimes 
 
Ajay Sharma* 
Abstract 
This article provides a comparative legal study of certain salient aspects 
of the Chinese and Indian Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) regimes, 
keeping in mind the differences in the constitutions and legal systems of 
both countries. India is presently perceived by foreign investors as having 
an uncertain regulatory environment as far as its FDI policy. However, 
implementation is a concern, though the government seeks to attract huge 
foreign investment, which is also viewed as a panacea to the mounting 
current account deficit problem. On the other hand, China has shown a 
consistent surge in FDI inflows in spite of its economic slowdown and 
marked legal reforms in recent years. Are there takeaway lessons for India 
from the merits (and demerits) of the Chinese Foreign Investment Regime? 
Yes, India can certainly learn from China’s “national investment 
policymaking,” though the benefits derived from this comparative study 
can be mutual. This article also objectively critiques relevant existing 
literature, revealing problems present in both FDI Regimes. 	  
 
Introduction 
 Though China is currently far ahead of India in attracting Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), both countries are ranked by Transnational 
Corporations (TNCs) in the top prospective host economies for FDI for 
the 2013-15 period1, first and third respectively. The question is how does 
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India realize its potential as it emerges as one of the top FDI destination 
countries? The solution can be explored from multiple perspectives: 
economic, political and legal. In the competition for FDI, India should not 
perceive China as a rival, indulging in a zero sum game. Instead, both 
countries should regionally integrate to create a positive sum game, 
benefitting Asia as a whole. Setting aside their political differences, 
mutually beneficial economic gains can be realized by both emerging 
countries. This article proposes to undertake a comparative analysis of 
salient law and policy aspects of the FDI Regimes in China and India. The 
comparisons will assess the differences in the constitutions and the legal 
systems of both countries. A researcher cannot objectively critique 
comparative laws without appreciating these fundamental differences. 
Moreover, this article pertinently critiques certain existing literature on the 
present topic.2 Currently, India is perceived as having an uncertain 
regulatory environment as far as its FDI policy and its implementation is 
concerned. This increases transaction costs and becomes detrimental to the 
goal of the Indian Government to attract a large amount of FDI. It is 
arguable that due to enhanced legal and political risks, with an unfriendly, 
opaque, and uncertain legal and regulatory environment no host nation can 
attract sustainable and considerable FDI flows, regardless of its 
commercial and economic potential. Can there be lessons for India from 
the merits (and demerits) of the Chinese Foreign Investment Regime? The 
answer would vehemently be in the affirmative. India can certainly learn 
from China’s “national investment policymaking,” leading to an enhanced 
quantity and quality of FDI and translating into concrete economic gains 
and spill-over effects. Like China, India could realize consistent surges in 
FDI inflows in spite of economic slowdown, resulting in marked legal 
reforms. However, the comparative law and policy analysis done in this 
paper presents a learning opportunity for the Chinese scholars and 
policymakers too. 
 
I. The 1982 Chinese Constitution and the Chinese Legal System 
 
After Mao’s death in 1976, the open door reforms were initiated in 
the Chinese Communist Party’s third plenum of the 11th Congress in 1978 
under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, marking the end of the Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution.3 These efforts resulted in the current 1982 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, which is the “fundamental 
                                                                                                                     
http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf (last visited Jul 29, 2014) 
(hereinafter WIR 2013).  
2 See e.g., Rohit Sachdev, Comparing the Legal Foundations of Foreign Direct 
Investment in India and China: Law and the Rule of Law in the Indian Foreign Direct 
Investment Context, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 167 (2006) (hereinafter Sachdev).  
3 See QIANFAN ZHANG, THE CONSTITUTION OF CHINA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 47-48 
(2012) (hereinafter Zhang). 
 
 
3                                      Chi.-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L.                     Vol. XV 
law of the State and has supreme legal effect,” as per its preamble.4 The 
principle of “democratic centralism” is at the center of the Chinese 
institutional governance.5  The centrist element in administration requires 
the central government to supervise and guide local authorities.6 Article 
11, a radical provision in the Chinese Constitution, was amended several 
times.  The final amendment known as ”Amendment Fourth,” was 
approved on March 14, 2004 by the 10th National People’s Congress 
(NPC) at its 2nd Session, and Article 11 now reads:7 
 
Individual, private and other non-public economies that 
exist within the limits prescribed by law are major 
components of the socialist market economy." "The State 
protects the lawful rights and interests of the non-public 
sectors of the economy such as the individual and private 
sectors of the economy. The State encourages, supports and 
guides the development of the non-public sectors of the 
economy and, in accordance with law, exercises 
supervision and control over the non-public sectors of the 
economy."8  
 
Moreover, Article 11 should be read in conjunction with the 
mandate in Article 13. After being amended in 2004, Article 13 now 
reads: 
 
Citizens' lawful private property is inviolable . . . "The 
State, in accordance with law, protects the rights of citizens 
to private property and to its inheritance" . . .  "The State 
may, in the public interest and in accordance with law, 
expropriate or requisition private property for its use and 
                                                
4 See CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (adopted on Dec. 4, 1982), 
available at: http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited Jul 
29, 2014) (hereinafter CHINESE CONSTITUTION); id. at 50. The Chinese Constitution is a 
unitary constitution. 
5 Zhang, supra note 3, at 50-51. 
6 See CHINESE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at Art. 3  (reading inter alia “The division of 
functions and powers between the central and local state organs is guided by the principle 
of giving full play to the initiative and enthusiasm of the local authorities under the 
unified leadership of the central authorities.”); Zhang, supra note 3, at 51. 
7 A careful comparison of the subsequent amendments with the previous ones and the 
original provision, as expressed in English language, shows certain discrepancies; as the 
original provision which has undergone amendment, as reproduced in some amendments 
are inaccurately written. Thus, at least the English version of the Chinese Constitution 
has discrepancies, which may not be there in the authoritative Chinese version; but due to 
the language limitations of this researcher the one in Chinese cannot be read and 
understood. CHINESE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4.  
8 Id. 
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shall make compensation for the private property 
expropriated or requisitioned."9  
 
However, the absence of qualifying adjectives like, “prompt,” “effective,” 
“adequate,” and “just” may practically render this state obligation to pay 
‘compensation’ pretty much useless. Yet this amendment was meant to be 
a significant and welcome addition to the Chinese constitution in 2004.10   
In another amendment to the Chinese Constitution of 1993, known 
as “Amendment Two,” the reference to “state enterprises” in Article 16 
was changed to “state-owned enterprises” which demonstrated recognition 
of separation between ownership and management which hitherto was in 
the hands of the State. Furthermore, the Chinese Constitution also 
emphasizes that China is in primary stage of socialism and “the basic task 
of the nation is to concentrate its effort on socialist modernization in 
accordance with the theory of building socialism with Chinese 
characteristics.”11 These welcome and radical constitutional reforms in 
China have caused some apparent internal inconsistencies and tensions 
within the constitutional provisions; and despite these amendments, the 
Chinese State and Constitution in essence remain authoritarian.12  The 
Chinese Constitution and laws, which have not been very dynamic, have 
often lagged behind the rapid social transformation in China. Accordingly, 
a thesis of “benign violation” has been propounded, advancing the view 
that under these circumstances some violations of the constitution and 
laws should be tolerated and legitimized for their salutary societal effects 
which otherwise would not be achieved.13 However, the continuing 
economic reforms in China, though allegedly without “political check and 
balances,” have widened the gulf of economic disparities between its 
people.  This has resulted in a growing accumulation of wealth in the 
hands of some at the expense of ordinary people’s livelihood and 
sometimes even lives.14 This undesirable by-product of economic 
progress, as a result of China moving towards a socialist (market) 
economy, has caused tremendous pressure on the Chinese government to 
advance “maintenance of stability” and “social harmony” in the country.15 
In essence, there are four levels of governance in China: the central 
government; the provinces; the cities and counties; and townships and 
districts within cities.16 The size of the central government in China is not 
                                                
9 Id. 
10 See also Zhang, supra note 3, at 58. 
11 See CHINESE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at Amend. 3.  
12 See  Zhang, supra note 3, at 60. 
13 See id. at 61. 
14 See id. at 73. 
15 See id. 
16 See CHINESE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at Art. 95; Zhang, supra note 3, at 82. 
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very large because the local governments and villages are in charge of 
implementing most regulations.17  
The unitary framework of China’s central laws is unlimited in 
competence and unconditionally superior to all local regulations.18 In fact, 
local assemblies at any level can only pass “regulations,” as “law”-making 
is in the exclusive domain of the national legislature.19 However some 
conflicts arise between local legislations and rules enacted by the central 
government, despite the unlimited superiority of the latter.20 Turning now 
to the hierarchy of legal norms in China, the 1982 Constitution in its 
preamble is declared to be the “fundamental law of the State and has 
supreme legal effect,” designating it the apex of legal authority in China.21 
According to Article 5 of the Chinese Constitution, “[n]o law or 
administrative or local rules and regulations shall contravene the 
constitution” and “[n]o organization or individual may enjoy the privilege 
of being above the Constitution and the law.”22 Courts cannot apply or 
enforce any constitutional provision in their decisions, and only the 
standing committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) under 
Article 67 of the Constitution has the power “to interpret the Constitution 
and supervise its enforcement” and “to interpret the statutes.”23 In fact, the 
Chinese Constitution is a kind of party manifesto “rather than an 
instrument which is legally binding upon the organs of the State or which 
may be legally enforced by an aggrieved individual.”24 One view claims 
that the NPC is competent to exercise all powers of the State and “the 
powers of the party in power are unlimited and if any of their acts be 
tyrannical, there is no prospect of getting relief from an independent 
judiciary.”25 
The statutes enacted by the NPC or its standing committee form 
the second tier of legal norms known as “laws.” There are no limits on the 
scope of national legislation so long as it does not violate any 
constitutional provisions.26 Below the “laws” are the administrative 
directions enacted by the State council. An administrative regulation does 
not grant, but rather limits, administrative powers.27 Further, 
administrative regulations need not be pre-authorized by a “law,” and are 
                                                
17 See Zhang, supra note 3, at 83-84. 
18 See id.  at 84. 
19 See id. 
20 See id. 
21 CHINESE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4. 
22 Id. at Art. 5. 
23 See also Zhang, supra note 3, at 85; B M GANDHI, DR DURGA DAS BASU COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 133 (2 ed. 2008) (hereinafter Gandhi).   
24 Gandhi, supra note 21, at 152. 
25 Id. at 375. 
26 See Zhang, supra note 3, at 85-86. 
27 See id. at 86. 
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deemed lawful unless they contravene any existing legal provisions.28 
However, the structure of the level below administrative regulations 
becomes somewhat obfuscated when one looks at the local regulations 
enacted by the provincial Local People’s Congresses (LPCs) and 
departmental rules made by Ministries and Commissions under the State 
Council.29 In fact, Article 82 of P.R.C. Legislation Law (LL),30 amended 
in 2000, equates the effects of rules of departments and rules of local 
government, though confining their application “to their respective limits 
of authority.”  Below this level exists the lowermost, but arguably most 
pragmatic, tier of legal order.  This level is comprised of a massive body 
of “normative documents,” made by a variety of governmental units at all 
levels and executed with great swiftness and zeal, such as: orders; 
decisions; notices; and instructions of general applicability.31 Actually, 
these “normative documents”’ are the Chinese version of “red tape.”32 
Unfortunately, despite China’s “Regulation on Disclosures of Government 
Information,” passed in 2007 and requiring publication of all 
documentation, in practice many of such orders are not published in 
accordance with the regulation.33  However, it is alleged, that the laws 
considered to be at the top of the hierarchy of norms get paid lip service 
and the above unpublished rules, made without public consultations and 
often against public interest, are  zealously enforced.34  
 
Article 63 of the LL inter alia provides that:  
 
[t]he people's congresses or their standing committees of 
the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities 
directly under the Central Government may, in light of the 
specific conditions and actual needs of their respective 
administrative areas, formulate local regulations, provided 
that such regulations do not contradict the Constitution, the 
laws and the administrative regulations. 35 
 
China lacks a centralized mechanism for reviewing legality of legislation. 
So to tackle the problems like “legislation fighting,’ LL was enacted in the 
year 2000 in order to “define a complex hierarchy of reviewing 
                                                
28 See id. 
29 See id. 
30 See LEGISLATION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (ORDER OF THE 
PRESIDENT NO.31), (2000)., promulgated on Mar. 15, 2000. 
31 See Zhang, supra note 3, at 87. 
32 See id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 98-99. 
35 Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China (Adopted by the third Sess. of the 
Ninth Nat’l People’s Cong. on March 15, 2000 and promulgated by Order No. 31 of the 
President of China on March 14, 2000) Art.63 (China). 
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authorities.” As mentioned above, legislative review significantly limits 
the scope of judicial review by completely precluding courts from 
reviewing ”concrete administrative acts” and does not extend to ”abstract 
administrative acts” such as laws, regulations, rules or any other normative 
documents of general nature.36 The real problem in China is identified as 
the executive’s failure to faithfully enforce the Constitution and laws, and 
that “the governments often systemically practice a set of ‘latent rules,’ 
rules not found in open texts but formulated and carried out beneath what 
appears on the surface, often without public knowledge.”37   
This article now turns to the judicial system in China. The 
Supreme People’s Court (SPC) is the highest court in China. Additionally,  
each province, municipality and autonomous region possess a High Court 
as well. Middle-level courts are present in cities which are divided into 
districts; and basic-level courts exist in city districts, counties and cities 
which have not been further divided into districts.38 The Chinese judiciary 
is politicized and allegedly suffers from “Chinese judicial syndrome,” 
which is an “interlocking combination of dysfunctional symptoms.”39 
According to Prof. Zhang Qianfan of Peking University’s Law School, the 
following are “dysfunctional symptoms” of “Chinese judicial syndrome”: 
 
(1) local protectionism that seriously undermines the 
uniformity of law; (2) overall low professional and moral 
quality of judges, making them prone to corruption and 
unfit for impartial administration of justice; (3) 
bureaucratic management of the courts and political control 
of the judges, which are at odds with the generally 
recognized principle of judicial independence and 
impartiality; and (4) the lack of adequate material 
provisions (salary, funding and working conditions) for 
effective functioning of the courts.40    
 
There have been successive attempts to reform the Chinese judiciary over 
the course of five-year outlines, beginning in 1999, which have established 
varied results.41 Moreover, China has a long way to go in order to really 
achieve constitutionalism, despite having a written constitution.  
II. Chinese FDI Legal Regime 
 
                                                
36 See Zhang, supra note 3, at 95.  
37 Id. at 98. 
38 Id. at 181-182.  
39 Id. at 186. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 188-94.  
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The above background knowledge is required to objectively 
compare the merits of the FDI regime in China, with that of India. Prior to 
indulging in such broad comparisons, it is necessary to fully appreciate the 
FDI regime of China. China uses the following four corporate vehicles for 
FDI: Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises (WFOEs), which are the most 
popular mode of FDI; the two types of Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures 
viz., the Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture (EJV) and the Chinese-
foreign Contractual Joint Venture (CJV); and lastly the more recent 
Foreign Invested Company Limited by Shares (FICLS).42 The cross border 
merger route is also available, and will be briefly discussed. It is worth 
mentioning, that the governing laws in China were amended after its entry 
into the World Trade Organization (WTO) to comply with the WTO 
norms.  Though the Chinese FDI Regime is pretty complex, one of its 
distinguishing features, as seen above, is the creation and legal recognition 
of separate standardized business vehicles specifically for FDI.43 The basic 
feature of all FDI in China, through any of the above modes, is that 
mandatory approval is required from the specified authorities, though the 
time limits for approval applications of each mode are statutorily 
prescribed.44  
The “Law of People’s Republic of China on Chinese-foreign 
Equity Joint Ventures” (EJV Law) which was the first law to govern 
Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs), was originally promulgated in the 
year 1979 and is still the governing law for EJVs. The EJV Law is quite 
pithy, consisting of just 16 articles, though it’s elaborate Implementing 
Regulation is made up of 105 articles.45  According to Article 4 of the EJV 
Law, the EJV shall consist of a limited liability company (LLC), and the 
                                                
42 See e.g., Hui Huang, The Regulation of Foreign Investment in Post-WTO China: A 
Political Economy Analysis, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 185, 188 (2009) (hereinafter Huang); 
and Jim Jinpeng Zhang & Jung Y. Lowe, Foreign Investment Companies Limited by 
Shares: The Latest Chinese Organization for Major International Ventures, 21 NW. J. 
INT’L. L. & BUS. 409 (2001) (hereinafter Zhang & Lowe). 
43 See also Matthew Sweeney, Foreign Direct Investment in India and China: The 
Creation of a Balanced Regime in a Globalized Economy, 43 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 207, 
210 (2010) (hereinafter Sweeney). 
44 Article 3 of the EJV Law prescribes a three month period for approval authorities to 
arrive at their decision. Under Article 5 of the CJV Law, the same period is shortened to 
45 days. Article 6 of the WFOE Law establishes a similar 90 day decision period. Law of 
the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (Adopted at the 
Second Sess. of the Fifth Nat’l People's Cong. on July 1, 1979 and promulgated by Order 
No.7 of the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Nat’l People's Cong. on July 8, 
1979; amended according to the Decision on Amending the Law of the People's Republic 
of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures made at the Third Sess. of the 
Seventh Nat’l People's Cong. on April 4, 1990, and amended for the second time 
according to the Decision on Amendment to the Law of the People's Republic of China 
on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures adopted at the Fourth Sess. of the Ninth Nat’l 
People's Cong. on March 15, 2001) (China) (hereinafter EJV Law). 
45 See also Huang, supra note 42, at 188-89.  
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proportion of investment contributed by the foreign investor in an EJV 
“shall generally not be less than 25% of the registered capital” of the 
EJV.46  
Though the EJV Law does not restrict the maximum foreign 
capital participation in an EJV, the same is restricted by the sectoral policy 
as contained in the “Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment 
Industries” (Catalogue) (as amended last in 2011). The Catalogue divides 
“foreign investment industries” into the following categories: “encouraged 
foreign investment industries,” “restricted foreign investment industries,” 
and “prohibited foreign investment industries.” All other types of 
industries not mentioned in the catalogue are “permitted investments.” In 
these three non-prohibited categories, “encouraged,” “permitted,” and 
“restricted,” there is an increasing degree of pace and complexity in the 
approval process and considerable variance in designated approval 
authorities, depending on the monetary value of investment.47 The 
Catalogue also places restrictions on the form of business associations, to 
the above four categories, in certain sectors. For example, under the 
“encouraged foreign investment industries”’ list under the “mining and 
quarrying industries”’ for the “venture prospecting and exploitation of 
petroleum, natural gas” the only forms of FIE prescribed are EJV or a 
Contractual Joint Venture.48   
Article 5 of the EJV Law imposes the following condition: “The 
technology and the equipment that serve as a foreign joint venture's 
investment must be advanced technology and equipment that actually suit 
our country's needs. If the foreign joint venture causes losses by deception 
through the intentional use of backward technology and equipment, it shall 
pay compensation for the losses.”49 This condition is quite unique. Though 
Article 10 does not impose export obligations on an EJV, it “encourages” 
them. Article 15 of the EJV Law imposes upon the parties of an EJV to 
attempt resolving their disputes compulsorily first through consultation, 
and if that fails, through mediation or arbitration.50  If the parties are 
unable to reach an arbitration agreement, the dispute is to be resolved 
through the courts.51 In the case of expropriation of an EJV, pursuant to 
legal procedure in social public interest, the state under Article 2 will offer 
“corresponding compensation.”52 Additionally, a business license has to 
                                                
46 See EJV Law, supra note 44, at Art. 4.  
47 FRANÇOISE NICOLAS, CHINA AND FOREIGN INVESTORS: THE END OF A BEAUTIFUL 
FRIENDSHIP? (IFRI) 8 (2008). 
48 See Entry II.(2), Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries 
(Amended in 2011)(Ministry of Commerce, China “MOFCOM”),  available at 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/aaa/201203/20120308027837.shtml 
(last visited Dec. 6, 2014).  
49 EJV Law, supra note 44, at Art. 5.. 
50 Id. at Art. 15. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at Art. 2. 
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be obtained before commencing business as a EJV.53  One successful 
example of an EJV was carried out by Volkswagen, a well-known German 
Auto TNC, in 1984 for a term of 25 years (which was extended to 2030 in 
the year 2002).54 
The Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures Law (CJV Law) 
was promulgated in the year 1988, and has also undergone successive 
amendments like the EJV Law.55 A different set of elaborate CJV 
Implementing Regulations of 1995 are in existence. The broad objective 
of the CJV Law, similarly to the EJV Law, is in form of an enactment 
contained in its Article 1, which reads as follows:  
 
This Law is formulated to expand economic cooperation 
and technological exchange with foreign countries and to 
promote the joint establishment, on the principles of 
equality and mutual benefit, by foreign enterprises and 
other economic organizations or individuals (hereinafter 
referred to as the foreign party) and Chinese enterprises or 
other economic organizations (hereinafter referred to as the 
Chinese party) of Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint 
Ventures (hereinafter referred to as contractual joint 
ventures) within the territory of the People's Republic of 
China.56 
   
A CJV gives more flexibility to the parties in comparison to an 
EJV. The EJV Law statutorily prescribes sharing of profits, risks and 
losses between the parties to the EJV in proportion to the respective 
capital contributions, whereas the CJV Law allows the parties to 
determine proportions by the CJV contract. Though state protection to the 
lawful interests of the joint venture and its partners are statutorily 
extended in both the laws, Article 3 of the CJV Law explicitly places the 
CJV under the supervision of the “relevant state authority.”57 Further, 
Article 11 explicitly states, inter alia, that: “The right of a contractual joint 
venture to make its own operational and managerial decisions shall not be 
free from any interference.”58 In Article 4, the State encourages export 
oriented or technologically advanced CJVs, though the above rigorous 
requirement in the Article 5 of the EJV Law is absent.59 Article 25 of the 
                                                
53 Id. 
54 See Huang, supra note 42, at 192.  
55 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures 
(Adopted at the First Sess. Of the Seventh Nat’l People’s Cong. on April 13) (China) 
(hereinafter ‘CJV Law’). 
56 Id. at Art. 1. 
57 Id. at Art. 3. 
58 Id. at Art. 11. 
59 Id. at Art. 4. 
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CJV Law contains its dispute resolution provision for the joint venture 
parties, and is similar to the EJV Law provision discussed above.60  
However, consultations between parties are not even mandatory if the 
parties cannot agree, and in certain cases the dispute can go straight to 
litigation.61 One important distinction between the two laws is, even 
though an EJV is specifically required to be a LLC, a CJV may or may not 
be in a form of a company, though it is undoubtedly a separate “Chinese 
legal person.”62 A CJV must obtain a similar business license, and the date 
of issue is considered to be the date of establishment of the CJV.63  
To establish a Chinese-foreign joint venture three levels of 
approvals are needed: 
 
(1) a preliminary approval by the government department 
supervising the local Chinese enterprise, (2) final approval 
by the PRC authorities with jurisdiction over foreign trade 
and economic planning, and (3) the issuance of a business 
license by the appropriate government entities with 
authority over the regulation of industry and commerce. 64 
 
Joint ventures gained popularity among foreign investors as a way 
to counteract their own inexperience and unfamiliarity with the Chinese 
business and regulatory system, by obtaining a Chinese partner who 
possessed familiarity and experience with the Chinese business and 
regulatory environment.65 However, gradually the popularity of joint 
ventures declined and WFOEs became the most popular vehicle of FDI. 
The reasons behind the decline in popularity of Chinese-foreign joint 
ventures are two-fold, including conflicts of interests and business 
priorities between the Chinese and the foreign partner. For example, the 
local partner usually wanted quick dividends, but the foreign investing 
partner sought to reinvest earnings back in the joint ventures business.66 
Secondly, the local partner often used the technology the foreign partner 
brought to the joint venture to manufacture its own products, and saw 
nothing wrong with it, while the foreign partner viewed this 
misappropriation of technology as a breach of trust.67   
WFOEs are governed by the “Foreign-Invested Enterprise Law of 
PRC on Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise” (WFOE Law) which was 
                                                
60 Id. at Art. 25. 
61 Id. 
62 See EJV Law, supra note 44; CJV Law, supra note 55. 
63 CJV Law, supra note 55. 
64 DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS 528–29 (2005) (hereinafter Chow).  
65  Id. at 526.  
66 Id. at 554-55. 
67 Id.  
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originally promulgated in 1986.68 The WFOE Law also has a set of 
implementing regulations brought into force in 1990.69 Article 3 makes 
clear that a WFOE must benefit the development of the Chinese economy 
and that the State encourages establishment of export oriented WFOEs and 
the use of advanced technology.70 Furthermore, as stipulated by the State 
Counsel, certain lines of businesses are prohibited for WFOEs.  
Expropriation and compensation provisions are similar to the EJV Law 
discussed above. Similarly, per Article 7 of the WFOE Law, after 
obtaining a certificate of approval, within 30 days the WFOE shall apply 
to “industrial and commercial administrative authorities” to obtain a 
business license.71 The WFOE Law does not contain a dispute resolution 
clause.     
The last foreign investment vehicle which remains to be discussed 
is the Foreign Invested Company Limited by Shares (FICLS). FICLS are 
regulated by a 1995 Law called, “The Provisional Regulations on the 
Establishment of Foreign-Funded Joint Stock Companies Limited” 
(FICLS Regulations).72 This law allows “foreign shareholders” to jointly 
set up foreign funded joint stock companies with the “Chinese 
shareholders.” Both classes of “shareholders” can be “companies, 
enterprises and other economic entities or individuals,” foreign or 
Chinese, as applicable.73 According to Article 5 there are two alternative 
means of establishing a FICLS: “promotion”’ (involving, at least one 
foreign promoter) and “public offer,” whose eligibility norms are 
established in the second paragraph of Article 6.74 The minimum 
registered capital required for setting up a FICLS is RMB 30 million 
Yuan, with the total value of the shares purchased and held by the foreign 
shareholders consisting of no less than 25% of the company's total 
                                                
68 Law on Wholly Foreign- Owned Enterprises (Adopted  at the fourth Sess. Of the Sixth 
Nat’l People’s Congress on April 12, 1986, revised on October 31, 2000 at the 18th 
Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Nat’l People's Cong. by the Decision on 
Revision of the "Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Enterprises with Sole 
Foreign Investment) (China) (hereinafter WFOE Law). 
69 Id. 
70 Sachdev, supra note 2 at 208 (“In reality, pursuant to the WFOE Articles 3 and 6, a 
WFOE application will face tough examination prospects unless it encourages the 
development of China's national economy through one of the following (or related) 
methods: adoption of advanced technology and equipment; development of new 
products; production of import substitutes; or exportation of at least fifty percent of 
annual output. While the government has relaxed the approval procedures in practice, 
especially in non-crucial industries, the approval process is still more restrictive than that 
regulating joint ventures.”)  
71 WFOE Law, supra note 68, at Art. 7. 
72 Provisional Regulations on the Establishment of Foreign-Funded Joint Stock 
Companies Limited (Promulgated by Decree No. 1 of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation on January 10, 1995) (China) (hereinafter ‘FICLS Law’).   
73 See id. at Art. 1; and Zhang & Lowe, supra note 42.   
74 FICLS Law, supra note 72, at Art. 5-6. 
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registered capital.75 The approval process for both the aforementioned 
means to set up a FICLS is delineated in Article 9 of the FICLS 
Regulations.76  The FICLS Regulations also establish requirements and 
procedure to be followed for conversion of foreign funded joint ventures, 
WFOEs, and FICLS. FICLSs do not enjoy tax exemptions or tax 
deduction preferences which are available to joint ventures and WFOEs 
under domestic law.77 All regulatory filings are done in Chinese.       
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) though very popular modes of 
cross border investments globally, are not very popular among foreign 
investors investing in China. The law governing M&As is the “Provisions 
on the Takeover of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors,” enacted in 
2006. The law deals with two types of M&As: “Equity M&As” and 
“Asset M&As.” This article does not seek to focus on the Chinese M&A 
law, and thus does not explore the Chinese M&A regime further.78   
 
III. Comparing Chinese FDI Regime with the Indian one: the 
Analysis and Lessons (with a critique of Sachdev and 
Sweeney): 
 
This part of the article focuses on broadly comparing the Chinese 
and the Indian FDI Regimes and drawing some lessons from this 
comparative exercise.79 For this academic exercise, apart from having 
recourse to the preceding information and analysis, the author will use two 
pertinent articles which  indulge in a similar comparative exercise. The 
articles were published in the years 2006 and 2010, with the latter relying 
on the former. The first article is by Rohit Sachdev80 and the second article 
                                                
75 Id. at Art. 7. 
76 Id. at Art. 9. 
77 Id. at Art. 26.  
78 See Hui Huang, China’s New Regulation on Foreign M&A: Green Light or Red Flag?, 
30 UNSW LAW JOURNAL 802 (2007) (providing a detailed analysis of Chinese M&A 
law).  
79 See Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, Diapositives versus Movies – The Inner Dynamics 
of the Law and its Comparative Account,  THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
COMPARATIVE LAW 3, 3–4 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012) (stating 
emphatically that: “[n]owadays, much literature is produced by scholars who take a quick 
look at non-domestic legal systems, and thereby present their studies as comparative, 
while their analysis remains embedded in the positive law paradigm.” The author leaves 
it to his readers to determine whether this article is able to portray some elements of a 
standard ‘comparative’ law work or not); H. Patrick Glenn, Aims of Comparative Law, 
ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 57, 57–65 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006); Luke 
Nottage, Commercial Regulation, ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 135, 
135–45 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006).; Jens C. Dammann, The Role of Comparative Law in 
Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, ST. THOMAS L. REV. 513 (2002); JAAKKO 
HUSA, ABOUT THE METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE LAW—SOME COMMENTS 
CONCERNING THE WONDERLAND (MAASTRICHT WORKING PAPERS) (2007).      
80 See Sachdev, supra note 2.   
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is by Matthew Sweeney.81 This chapter does not endorse all the views 
expressed in these articles. In fact, to the contrary, it will indulge in a 
constructive criticism of some of the prominent views expressed in these 
articles, and challenge certain inferences drawn therein.  
Sachdev states in his article that, “India's statutory governance of 
FDI is comparatively more convoluted and more antiquated than China's, 
and therefore, it is less conducive to attracting, processing, and retaining 
FDI inflows.”82 This article refutes such a claim. The current Indian FDI 
statutory regime is based on the Foreign Exchange Management Act of 
1999 (“FEMA”) and its pertinent regulations, particularly the Foreign 
Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by a Person 
Resident outside India) Regulations of 2000 (commonly referred to as 
“FEMA 20” from its notification number). Even the government of India 
attempts to provide the FDI Policy in one place through its Consolidated 
FDI Policy, the current version of which has become recently available in 
April 2014. As far as “antiquity” is concerned, the basic laws and 
regulations governing Chinese FDI are older than their Indian counterparts 
and are not amended and updated as frequently as the Indian ones. 
However, it is true that sometimes too frequent amendments in laws cause 
an element of uncertainty in the regulatory environment, which is 
undesirable in policy formulation and implementation. These frequent 
policy changes also sometimes cause undesirable law and policy gaps.  
As far as Sachdev’s claim that India's governance of FDI is more 
“convoluted” than China’s, in my objective assessment, it is difficult to 
state which of the two legal regimes is more convoluted. The drafting of 
the Indian FDI Policy and Regulations appear to be better than their 
Chinese counterparts. The claim that the Indian laws are more 
“convoluted” is probably based on the assumption drawn from the article’s 
next sentence, which reads as follows: “[i]n addition, China uses distinct 
legal vehicles that prove more transparent and more comprehensible for 
foreign investors than India's outdated legislation.”83 As discussed above, 
the author fails to prove that Indian FDI Legislation is either antiquated or 
outdated. The fact that “China uses distinct legal vehicles,” as discussed 
above, does not prove his claim. In fact, the Chinese FDI Regime provided 
for these standardized foreign investment vehicles not in foreign investors’ 
interests, but rather to protect its own interests. The Chinese FDI Regime 
was skeptical of permitting and liberalizing FDI, so it created these 
statutes from the scratch in a “piecemeal ad hoc” manner, while carrying 
out its economic reforms through trial-and-error and allowing the 
government to roll them back if and when the measures do not succeed.84 
                                                
81 See Sweeney, supra note 43.   
82 See Sachdev, supra note 2, at 169.  
83 Id.  
84 See Huang, supra 42 , at 203-204 
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Actually, there are inconsistencies in the Chinese FIE laws.85 In fact, 
despite the efforts of the authorities to resolve conflicts between the 
Chinese Company Law and  FIE Regime, which are supposed to 
supplement and complement each other, whenever both apply, certain 
conflicts remain particularly due to certain difficulties in interpreting 
administrative opinions, decisions and decrees issued for this purpose.86  
The second statement made by Sachdev which deserves comment 
states as follows: “China, on the other hand, has a vertically integrated 
FDI approval process, which generates significant tension between state 
and national authorities but is nevertheless comparatively more facilitative 
of FDI inflows.”87 As far as foreign exchange control laws and FDI Policy 
in India is concerned, both of them are made at the national level, and not 
at the state level. Even the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB), 
whose clearance becomes indispensible for the sectors/activities falling 
under the “government route” as per the Indian FDI Policy, comes under 
the Central Government’s Ministry of Finance. As far as local or state 
level clearances are required, only the competent authorities can give 
them. Similarly, when an FDI deal in India triggers the Takeover Code 
(administered by the Securities and Exchange Board of India), the 
Companies Act provisions, or the Competition Act provisions 
(administered by the Competition Commission of India), the same have to 
be complied with, and the requisite regulatory approvals sought.  In fact, 
when seeking approval for FDI per se, there is no three-layered structure 
in India as in China. Most of the sectors/activities open for FDI in India 
now fall under the “automatic route” and require no prior approval from 
the Reserve Bank of India (RBI)/Government, only subsequent reporting. 
The differences in the Chinese unitary system and the Indian federal 
system must be kept in mind when comparing the two regimes, and an 
author’s preference for one over the other may be very subjective.  
The third statement in Sachdev that merits response reads as 
follows:88  
 
This analysis reveals that a country's (in this case, China's) 
disregard of the “rule of law” in political governance may, 
ironically, allow it more effectively (1) to grant rule of law 
protections to investors and (2) to implement more efficient 
approval processes than a country such as India, which 
preserves rule of law at the highest levels of governance, 
yet at the expense of streamlined FDI statutory governance 
and approval procedures. As a result, China can tailor more 
effectively its FDI governance to foreign direct investors' 
                                                
85 See id. at 204. 
86 See id. at 209-12 
87 Sachdev, supra 2, at 169.   
88 Id. at 169-70.   
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interests and assist them in circumventing red tape and 
procedural delay. 
 
The above statement suggests that “rule of law” is antithetical to an 
efficacious FDI regime, which this article disputes. In fact, in international 
investment law, the standard of protection that has dramatically arose to 
prominence is the “Fair and Equitable Treatment” (FET) Standard, which 
draws upon the host state’s capability to maintain “rule of law.”89 It has 
been proposed that the “rule of law,” embodied in different municipal 
legal systems, which aspires to “subject public power to legal control,” 
can be a standard for explaining the normative content of FET.90  
The following seven sub-elements emerge from the arbitral case 
law:91 (1) the requirement of stability, predictability, and consistency of 
the legal framework; (2) the principle of legality; (3) the protection of 
legitimate expectations; (4) procedural due process and denial of justice; 
(5) substantive due process and protection against discrimination and 
arbitrariness; (6) transparency; (7) the principle of reasonableness and 
proportionality. Some elaboration on some of these sub-elements is 
necessary. Legal security and legal certainty, which are derived from the 
“rule of law” concept, are associated with domestic law and corresponds 
to sub-element (1) above.92 There are limits to this sub-element, as foreign 
investors are not excluded from the regulatory changes taking place in the 
host state.93 Thus, a foreign investor needs to do investment planning and 
adjust itself to the host state's legal framework.94 On the sub-element (2) 
pertaining to “legality,” the domestic actors compliance with national laws 
is used as a basis for assessment of FET.95  The sub-element (3) relates to 
“legitimate expectations,” which can arise from the general framework's 
provisions of the host state.96  
As far as the existence of red-tape is concerned, as discussed 
above, a lot of red-tape orders are passed by the Chinese authorities and 
remain unpublished.97 It is unfortunately true that undesirable bureaucratic 
corruption and red-tape exists in the Indian system too, which, in absence 
of any evidence, may or may not have attributed to the delays in approval 
                                                
89 See generally, Stephen W. Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment, The Rule of Law, and 
Comparative Public Law,   INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW (Stephen W. Schill ed., 2010). 
90 Id. at 158–59.  
91 Id. at 159-60. 
92 Id. at 161. 
93 Id.  
94 Id.  
95 Id. at 162. For example, in Noble Ventures v. Romania, ICSID 12/10/2005, the tribunal 
relied on observance of domestic legal rules to decline violation of FET. 
96 Schill, supra note 89, at 165.  
97 See supra note 33 and accompanying text 
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and implementation process in foreign investment deals.98 However, the 
preciseness and certainty in FDI law and policy, and its implementation by 
the regulators whose regulatory space is well delineated and without 
overlaps and without any regulatory overreach, is much desired in the 
Indian FDI Regime.99 The professional, competent and independent 
Judiciary in India, with a large number of competent, able assisting 
corporate lawyers, is not bad for foreign investors; it actually increases the 
effectiveness of the legal system, which is one of the important 
determinants in attracting FDI in a host state.100  
The numerous problems in the Chinese judicial system have been 
discussed above, and Sachdev is not oblivious to them.101 Furthermore, the 
High Courts in India and its Supreme Court have the efficacious power of 
judicial review over both the legislation and the administrative law. In 
somewhat contradistinction to its Chinese counterparts, as discussed 
above, this judicial review is also available to the foreign invested Indian 
entities, and to the foreign investors as well, to challenge these laws and 
administrative actions.102 These Indian courts can effectively address 
violations of constitutional provisions, providing suitable reliefs to the 
aggrieved persons. Despite this, though, it is also correct that the Indian 
courts are overburdened with work, and the extreme docket pressure 
sometimes leads to inordinate delays in disposal of cases, with undesirable 
results for both India as a host state and for the affected foreign 
                                                
98 See, e.g., T.R. SAREEN & S.R. BAKSHI, 3 SOCIO-ECONOMICS & POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH ASIA 124–61.  
99 See Ajay Kr. Sharma, A Critique of the Indian FDI Law and Policy: Problems & 
Solutions, 2 NLUJ LAW REVIEW 30, 54–55 (2013) (hereinafter Sharma). 
100 See Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Finding and Facing Facts about Legal Systems and 
Foreign Direct Investment in South Asia, 23 LEGAL STUD. 649, 668–69 (2003) 
(establishing that the Indian courts were most 'effective' when compared to the ones in 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, the UK and the US; suggesting a locational advantage for India in 
this respect for attracting FDI).. 
101 See Sachdev, supra note 2, at 184-85. 
102 See M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 461–505 (5 ed. 2003); DR. JUSTICE A R 
LAKSHMANAN, A R MANOHAR & JUSTICE BHAGABATI PROSAD BANERJEE, 2 DURGA DAS 
BASU SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1185–1361; 1379–1458 (14 ed.) (discussing the 
powers of the Indian High Courts to issue certain writs including, writ of mandamus); 
T.R. Andhyarujina, The Evolution of Due Process of Law by the Supreme Court, 
SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIABLE 193, 193–213 (B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., 2000); I. P. 
MASSEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 283–434 (7 ed. 2008) (discussing inter alia both the 
principles and modes of judicial review of administrative action in India); S.P. SATHE, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 51–112, 216–296 (1999); JUSTICE G. P. SINGH & JUSTICE ALOK 
ARADHE, MP JAIN & SN JAIN: PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 584–688 (6 ed. 
2010) (discussing inter alia at length judicial control of administrative action and judicial 
control of administrative discretionary  powers in India including in cases of abuse of 
discretion involving mala fides and exercise of power on irrelevant considerations); 
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT (GOVERNMENT OF INDIA) 
58–59 (2010) (discussing the importance of judicial review as an important part of rule of 
law for reasons of  accountability, fairness and participation).   
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investor.103 These merits in the Indian Legal and Judicial system should 
not be undermined when comparing the Chinese and Indian regimes, 
though the systemic problems should be tackled institutionally for both 
investment promotion and efficacious protection.  
Before proceeding further, a comparative table below presents 
comparisons between China and India on some indicators used by 
Transparency International (TI) (including some borrowed ones) to 
measure inter alia corruption, transparency and governance standards, 
with author’s inferences:104 
 
 Table: Comparisons of China with India on TI Indicators 
                                                
103See White Industries Australia Ltd. v. Republic of India, 2011 UNCITRAL, Final 
Award (Nov. 30). 
104 See Transparency International (Accountability) for India, 
http://www.transparency.org/country#IND (last visited Dec. 7, 2014); Transparency 
International (Accountability) for China, http://www.transparency.org/country#CHN (last 
visited Dec. 7, 2014). 
Indicator 
(ref. year) 
Explanation of  
the indicator 
Performance Author’s 
Inferences China India 
Corrupt-
ion 
Percept-
ion Index 
(2014) 
“The Corruption 
 Perception 
Index ranks 
countries/territori
es based on how 
corrupt a 
country’s public 
sector is 
perceived to be. 
It is a composite 
index, drawing 
on corruption-
related data from 
expert and 
business surveys 
carried out by a 
variety of 
independent and 
reputable 
institutions. 
Scores range 
from 0 (highly 
corrupt) to 100 
(very clean).” 
 
RANK: 
100/174 
 
SCORE: 
36/100 
 
RANK: 
85/174 
 
SCORE: 
38/100 
 
In comparison to 
the 2013 Index, the 
position of India 
has significantly 
improved to 85 
from 94, whereas 
the position of 
China has 
drastically fallen by 
20 places from 80 
to 100. In fact. there 
is complete reversal 
of ordering from the 
last year’s tally. 
India now leads 
China by 2 percent  
by improving its 
score by 6 percent. 
This casts doubts 
over the efficacy 
over the Chinese 
policy to tackle 
corruption 
concerning  both 
“tigers and flies”; 
though significant 
scope for 
improvement exists 
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for India as well.    
Control of 
Corruption 
(2010) 
“Control of 
corruption reflect
s perceptions of 
the extent to 
which public 
power is 
exercised for 
private gain. 
This includes 
both petty and 
grand forms of 
corruption, as 
well as "capture" 
of the state by 
elites and private 
interests. Point 
estimates range 
from about   -2.5 
to 2.5. Higher 
values 
correspond to 
better 
governance 
outcomes.” 
RANK: 
percentile 
33% 
 
SCORE: 
-
0.60302871
2 
 
RANK 
percentile 
36% 
 
SCORE: 
-
0.51671917
2 
 
The authenticity of 
this indicator is 
more, as it used and 
measured by the 
World Bank to 
calculate ‘World 
Governance 
Indicators’, being 
one of its six 
dimensions. On this 
indicator India 
scores better than 
China, though only 
marginally, by three 
percentiles.   
Open 
Budget 
Index 
(2010) 
“The Open 
Budget Index 
assesses the 
availability in 
each country of 
eight key budget 
documents, as 
well as the 
comprehensivene
ss of the data 
contained in 
them. 
 
It also examines 
the extent of 
effective 
oversight 
provided by 
legislatures and 
supreme audit 
institutions, as 
well as the 
opportunities 
available to the 
public to 
participate in 
national budget 
decision-making 
processes. Scores 
BUDGET 
OPEN-
NESS: 
Scant or 
none 
 
SCORE: 
13 
 
BUDGET 
OPEN-
NESS: 
Significant 
 
 
SCORE: 
67 
 
Here, Indian score 
is significantly 
higher than the 
Chinese. A more 
‘open budget’ 
shows at least 
greater transparency 
in fiscal policy 
making which is 
good for foreign 
investors.  
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range from 0 
(scant or no 
information) to 
100 (extensive 
information).” A 
more elaborate 
classification 
into different 
categories on 
basis of the said 
scores is also 
done. 
Judicial 
Independe
nce (2011-
2012) 
“Judicial 
Independence is 
an indicator in 
the Global 
Competitiveness 
Index produced 
by the World 
Economic 
Forum. 
It  measures the 
perceived extent 
in which the 
judiciary of the 
country is 
independent 
from influences 
of members of 
government, 
citizens, or firms. 
Scores range 
from 1 (heavily 
influenced) to 7 
(entirely 
independent).” 
RANK: 
63/142 
 
SCORE: 
3.9/7 
 
RANK: 
51/142 
 
SCORE: 
4.3/7 
 
A 5.71 per cent 
difference in the 
‘judicial 
independence’ 
indicator between 
the Chinese and the 
Indian judiciary 
does not appear to 
be too significant 
and alarming. 
However, the 
researcher’s above 
claims based on the 
doctrinal research, 
and on basis of his 
personal experience 
as an Indian 
Lawyer, currently 
an academic, and in 
past as a practising 
Advocate and a 
Judge makes him 
doubt this marginal 
difference. The 
constitutional 
differences, 
discussed above, 
themselves show 
much difference in 
the judicial powers 
and autonomy of 
the superior courts 
in both countries as 
far as powers of 
judicial review are 
concerned alone.     
Rule of 
Law 
(2010) 
“This dimension 
captures 
perceptions of 
the extent to 
which agents 
have confidence 
RANK: 
percentile  
45% 
 
SCORE: 
-
RANK: 
percentile  
55% 
 
SCORE: 
-
On this indicator 
India significantly 
leads China. The 
anticipated benefits 
of ‘rule of law’ for 
foreign investors 
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in and abide by 
the rules of 
society, and in 
particular the 
quality of 
contract 
enforcement, 
property rights, 
the police, and 
the courts, as 
well as the 
likelihood of 
crime and 
violence. 
Rule of Law is 
one of the six 
dimensions of 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators. Point 
estimates range 
from about -2.5 
to 2.5. Higher 
values 
correspond to 
better 
governance 
outcomes.”  
 
0.34683992
3 
 
0.05776936
4 
 
have been discussed 
above.    
Voice & 
Accountab
ility 
(2010) 
 
“Voice and 
Accountability c
aptures 
perceptions of 
the extent to 
which a country's 
citizens are able 
to participate in 
selecting their 
government, as 
well as freedom 
of expression, 
freedom of 
association, and 
a free media. 
Control of 
corruption is one 
of the six 
dimensions of 
the Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators. Point 
estimates range 
from about -2.5 
to 2.5. Higher 
RANK: 
percentile  
5 % 
 
SCORE: 
- 
1.6495012 
1 
 
 
RANK: 
percentile  
59 % 
 
SCORE: 
-
0.42402758 
 
As expected due to 
the differences in 
the forms of 
governments 
between the two 
countries, China 
scores poorly on 
this indicator, 
whereas India, 
being a robust 
democracy, scores 
reasonably well. 
This difference per 
se is beneficial for 
India as a FDI 
destination.  
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 Furthermore, it may also be incorrect to use the Chinese legal 
regime as the basis for justification of the rapid and huge FDI inflow into 
China compared to India, as there are several other determinants apart 
from “market-friendly” and investment & investor friendly and 
incentivizing policies which help in a host state becoming a magnet for 
FDI, including economic and business-facilitative factors, good 
infrastructure, and the state of existing and potential markets.105 It must 
also be kept in mind that even Sachdev concedes that there may be 
“round-tripping” to the extent of 50% of the FDI inflow reported by 
China, but still the gap between India and China in receiving FDI is 
considerable.106  
Let us now scrutinize another of Sachdev’s statements: “First, 
unlike in India's case, the Chinese government drafted FDI legislation by 
breaking dramatically with past economic and legal policy, thereby 
explicitly signaling to foreign investors China's desire for capital from 
abroad. Second, the structural framework of Chinese FDI laws proves 
relatively more transparent and user friendly than its Indian 
counterpart.”107 And further, “FDI legislation seemingly retains fewer rule 
of law elements than does its Chinese counterpart, which generally falls 
far short of extending rule of law protections to its own citizens. India's 
foreign investors must meander through a tangle of unclear and disjointed 
rules, whereas China's investors are afforded clear rules, protections, and 
rights, all embodied in the FIE vehicle of choice.”108 The 1991 Indian 
Industrial Policy, though not completely and unnecessarily breaking from 
the past, as FDI was permitted from a very long time in India, ushered in 
the era of liberalization of foreign investment regime in India. 
Subsequently, there have been numerous FDI law and policy reforms in 
India until date, with mixed results. 
Keeping in view the preceding submissions and the above discussion on 
the Chinese FDI regime, it does not appear to be relatively dramatic from 
the Indian standpoint, though it is indeed a dramatic reformation in China 
which started off only in 1979. The clarity and inconsistencies in the 
Chinese FDI Regime have already been commented on above. The 
                                                
105 See UNCTAD WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2003: FDI POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT: 
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, 86–87 (2003).  
106 Sachdev, supra note 2, at 176. 
107 Id. at 194. 
108 Id. at 198. 
values 
correspond to 
better 
governance 
outcomes.”  
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difficulty in understanding an alien legal regime for a foreign investor and 
his home country’s corporate lawyers is indeed real. Thus, for effective 
business transactions, the role of competent and efficient local legal 
counsels, experienced in dealing in the regulatory due diligence and other 
pertinent aspects relating to their national laws, cannot be undermined. 
Complexities exist in both Indian and Chinese regimes, making it 
terse to understand them holistically and wholesomely, and to connect the 
dots among the assorted laws that may apply in a particular FDI deal. As 
such, a simplistic comparison and inference as done by Sachdev, cannot 
be practical.  Sachdev subsequently states, that, “foreign investors are 
offered certain legally guaranteed (via legislative decree) rights in China, 
but only an administrative overseer in India.”109 It is true that the Chinese 
FIE laws explicitly guarantee certain limited rights to the foreign investors 
against certain state measures. On face of it, the absence of similar rights 
in Indian FDI laws appears to be a relative deficiency. However, as 
discussed above, the legal and constitutional rights and remedies are 
available to the foreign investors to enforce them in the Indian courts of 
competent jurisdiction. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, these statutory 
and constitutional rights may not be efficaciously enforced in the Chinese 
courts, though the Indian courts have been fair in adjudicating these claims 
against the State.110 The other relevant criticisms, made earlier, equally 
apply to this statement.  
Similarly, this article refutes the claim of  Sachdev that: “[t]he 
IDRA is the current form of the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948, 
which was passed upon independence more than fifty years ago with the 
goal of granting the federal government the ability to direct and to control 
industrial activities.”111 It is true that the Industries (Development and 
Regulation) Act of 1951 (“IDRA”) is a regressive industrial licensing law 
in India. But, as a result of the changes made in the 1991 Industrial policy 
and subsequent reforms, most of the industries in India are now exempted 
by the Central Government from the pertinent licensing provisions of the 
IDRA, thus rendering the IDRA pragmatically redundant in most cases. 
The above statement in Sachdev’s article is thus misleading. Furthermore, 
the service sector  is per se not covered under the IDRA. Another 
objectionable statement made by Sachdev reads: “Due to the conspicuous 
absence in India of Chinese-style, cookie-cutter legal vehicles for FIE 
formation, foreign investors considering investment in India inevitably 
confront less certainty and a more convoluted legal setting for investing.” 
The accuracy of this claim is refuted on the basis of this article’s 
preceding arguments.      
                                                
109 Sachdev, supra 2, at 196. 
110 See, e.g., Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India, 2012 1 Comp LJ 
225 (SC) (a 3 Judge bench decision of the Supreme Court of India). 
111 Sachdev, supra note 2, at 197. 
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After appreciating the governance and constitutional differences 
between the two countries, with one having a unitary structure and other 
having a federal structure,112 it is not difficult to observe the chinks in the 
following statement made by Sachdev: “The Chinese model formally 
incorporates state and local governments, while the Indian model is 
formally national and leaves foreign investors on their own to deal with 
the state and local governments once national approval has been 
granted.”113 No evidence is given about whether foreign investors in China 
have to deal with the Chinese local authorities themselves, or whether the 
centre facilitates their local clearances. However, in India, the “Foreign 
Investment Implementation Authority,” under the Central Government’s 
Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP), Ministry of 
Commerce, exists to help foreign investors obtain necessary approvals at 
both Central and State levels.114 Sachdev also criticizes the FIPB’s 
working and compares it to  the erstwhile Chinese  Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) (now MOFCOM).115 
Indeed, regardless of the comparisons, the FIPB needs to improve its 
transparency and efficiency. Restoration of “guidelines for consideration 
of FDI proposals by FIPB”116 in the Indian “consolidated FDI Policy” 
would go a long way in this respect.  
Lastly, one other statement made by Sachdev merits reaction. It 
reads: “[a]pprovals in China are likely to stall at the national level, but 
turnaround occurs much more quickly at the state and local levels.”117 
                                                
112 See Jain, supra note 102, at 553–55; CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Art. 245, 246 (adopted 
on Nov. 26, 1949), available at: http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/welcome.html (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2014) (hereinafter Indian Constitution)  (dealing with “extent of laws made by 
Parliament and by the Legislatures of States” and “Subject matter of laws made by 
Parliament and by the Legislatures of States” respectively). 
113 Sachdev, supra  note 2, at 208. 
114 See Foreign Investment Implementation Authority (FIIA), DEPARTMENT OF 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND PROMOTION (DIPP), 
http://dipp.nic.in/English/Investor/FIIA.aspx (last visited Dec. 2, 2014) (which reads: 
“Government of India has set up the Foreign Investment Implementation Authority 
(FIIA) to facilitate quick translation of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) approvals into 
implementation, to provide a pro-active one stop after care service to foreign investors by 
helping them obtain necessary approvals, sort out operational problems and meet with 
various Government agencies to find solution to their problems. Investors, facing any 
type of difficulties on implementation of projects, are requested to make application in 
the following proforma to the concerned authorities given in the Table below.”). 
115 See Sachdev, supra  note 2, at 209-10. 
116 See e.g., DIPP Circular 2, Para. 4.7 (2010) (establishing such guidelines); and Sharma, 
supra note 99, at 43-44.  
117 Sachdev, supra  note 2; see, REPORT OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT (GOVERNMENT OF INDIA) 22 (2002) (endorsing a 2001 A.T. 
Kearney study  itself states: “Despite a very similar historical mistrust of foreigners and 
foreign investment arising from colonial experience, modern (post 1980 China) differs 
fundamentally from India. Its official attitude to FDI, reflected from the highest level of 
government (PM, President) to the lowest level of government bureaucracy (provinces) is 
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Despite alleged excessive red-tape at the local level in China, if the 
approvals do come at quick speed, it may be due to two probable 
alternative reasons: either (1) with respect to FDI approvals, local 
authorities display a radically different attitude contradicting their usual 
approach or, (2) there are extraneous considerations involved in approval 
process that are speeding up the approvals at that level, though the former 
seems more likely.118 Though it is arguable that, after the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce promulgated measures for handling complaints by 
FIEs and foreign investors in 2006, the efficiency of granting clearances 
might have increased as a consequence.119 However, a close reading of 
these measures show that the remedies which may be meted out by the 
“complaint-accepting organ,” which focus on issuing suggestions and 
facilitating coordination between the complainants and concerned 
department, may not deter the erring officials enough to expedite the 
process.  An inducement of corruption to get the deals through may have 
its own drastic consequences on foreign investors coming from a 
developed capital exporting country. This is mostly due to their own 
home-state laws, rather than the host-state’s laws dealing with corruption 
in either China or India.120 Similar claims made elsewhere by Sachdev, 
which mostly reiterate the above submissions, are not dealt with herein. 
These criticisms are made purely in academic spirit, and do not display 
any national bias towards India. Further, they do not undermine the 
academic contribution of Sachdev.  
Sweeney rightly recognizes that “India’s regime is arguably more 
open” than China’s.121 In fact, the list of sectors that are prohibited for FDI 
in India is considerably shorter than the Chinese “Catalogue of Prohibited 
Foreign Investment Industries,” mentioned above. As far as the certainty 
in the classification policy for industries in the “Catalogue” is concerned, 
the Chinese policy has also been somewhat uncertain and changing, as 
suggested by the categorizations and subsequent re-categorizations in 
many sectors. Unlike the Indian FDI Policy, in China, the list of sectors 
prohibited for FDI contains certain industries which were not prohibited 
hitherto were added later on. For example, in the 2011 Catalogue, the real 
estate industry was reclassified from a “restricted” to a “prohibited” 
                                                                                                                     
one of consciously enticing FDI with a warm welcome. They recognize the multifaceted 
and mutual benefits arising from FDI.”) However, the reader will do well to keep in mind 
that this report is more than a decade old, and much water has flown in the river Ganges 
since 2002.    
118 See Chow, supra note 64, at 10-11. 
119 See PRC Ministry of Commerce, Decree No. 2 2006 (Oct. 1) (promulgating 
Provisional Measures of the Ministry of Commerce on Handling Complaints Lodged by 
Foreign-Invested Enterprises ).   
120 See, e.g., Chow, supra note 64, at 448-55 (discussing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
and its application on the US Corporations investing abroad).  
121 Sweeney, supra note 43, at 210. 
 
 
26                                      Chi.-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L.                     Vol. 
XV 
category.122  However, while Sweeney’s analysis goes on so well, it 
suddenly falters as soon as the author starts his comparative endeavor by 
examining “differences between each regime.” Partly, Sweeney’s analysis 
has to do with the reliance he places on Sachdev’s view that the Indian 
FDI regime is “antiquated” and “convoluted” (as expressed and critiqued 
above). It is important to note the following excerpt from Sweeney’s 
analysis:123 
 
Analytically, the differences can be divided between the 
statutory structure of each regime, including the legal entity 
used and the relevant governing regulations, and the 
approval process necessary to consummate a foreign 
investment. These differences go a long way toward 
explaining the dramatic disparities in FDI inflows between 
India and China and may better explain the current 
disparity in investment inflows than other political and 
economic explanations.  
 
The statutory structure of China's investment regime, and 
the context in which it was promulgated, provide investors 
with greater predictability of government actions, is more 
transparent and user-friendly, and by being tailored to FDI, 
has signaled China's deep and lasting commitment to 
attracting foreign investment. Rohit Sachdev summarizes 
the differences: 
“India's statutory governance of FDI is comparatively more 
convoluted and more antiquated than China's… India's 
outdated legislation.” 
 
Investors are unlikely to make significant investments 
unless they are provided some sense of certainty or 
predictability in how a host nation will interpret its FDI 
laws and whether it will respect the contractual rights and 
property rights inherent in the investment. Absent a high 
degree of confidence in the clarity, integrity, and stability 
of investment rules, investors may exaggerate the dangers 
inherent in a host nation's investment regime, resulting in 
less investment than would otherwise be provided.   
       
                                                
122 See Clifford Chance, AN OVERVIEW OF THE LATEST CHANGES TO CHINA’S INDUSTRY 
CATALOGUE FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT CLIFFORD CHANCE (2012), 
http://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2012/01/an_overview_of_thelatestchangestochi
na.html/An-Overview-of-the-Latest-Changes-to-China’s (last visited Jul 29, 2014). 
123 Sweeney, supra  note 43, at 226-27. 
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The arguments advanced above in respect of Sachdev’s similar views, 
some of which are expressly relied on by Sweeney, can be put forth 
against the above observations, so far as they criticize the Indian FDI 
Regime in comparison to the Chinese. In India, though FDI in companies 
registered under the Companies Act are the major concern of the FDI 
Regime, FDI in other forms of business vehicles, like partnerships and 
LLPs, is also conditionally allowed under the FDI Policy.124 Respective 
laws regulate all forms of business associations in India. In China too, as 
discussed above, the Chinese Companies Act applies to certain FIEs 
along-with their governing laws. So, such assumptions and inferences on 
lay comparisons between the two regimes are unjustified.    
Another of Sweeney’s excerpts which merits response reads as 
follows:125 
 
Investors may be more confident in China's commitment to 
attracting FDI than in India's efforts. First, investors may 
view China as more likely than democratic India to 
maintain consistent policy goals and objectives because of 
China's long-term communist leadership. Or alternatively, 
investors may have more confidence in a single party 
regime to put into effect liberalizing reforms beneficial to 
investors, which, in an open democracy, may be too 
politically costly to enact.  Second, China has explicitly and 
actively sought to reform its investment regime to court 
foreign investment in a way that signals a deep 
commitment to attracting and maintaining high levels of 
foreign investment. The sustainability of this commitment 
to foreign investment may be furthered by the single-party 
autocratic rule of China. Because there is less of a threat of 
political change in China, there may be a perception that 
the government is less likely to make an about-face and 
curtail investment rights. China's FDI laws were formed 
with the specific intention of attracting foreign investments 
and were tailored to that end, beginning with the 
promulgation of the EJV law following Deng Xiaoping's 
"open door policy" of 1979. Soon thereafter, the Chinese 
constitution was amended to more explicitly allow for 
foreign investment.  
 
                                                
124 See Consolidated FDI Policy Circular of 2014, ¶ 3.2 (Dep’t of Industrial Policy and 
Promotion (‘DIPP’), Min. of Commerce & Industry, Govt. of India, Apr. 17, 2014), 
http://dipp.gov.in/English/Policies/FDI_Circular_2014.pdf (last visited Jul 29, 2014) 
(hereinafter FDI Policy, 2014). 
125 Sweeney, supra note 43, at 228. 
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In fact, the above observations are amazing, if they offer explanation to 
the Chinese FDI growth. Sweeney firmly believes that a democracy such 
as India – keeping in mind the differences in ideologies amongst some 
political parties with respect to permissibility and limits of FDI in certain 
sectors – should provide a better overall investment environment when 
compared to a single party autocratic and communist state like China. 
Jensen (2003) and Busse (2004) show a positive association between 
democratic rights and FDI inflows. Just because the Chinese constitution 
and statutes explicitly give certain rights to the foreign investors, it does 
not mean that pragmatically it will lead to a better sense of security to the 
foreign investors and investment compared to India. The “rule of law” in a 
robust democracy in India with several institutional checks and balances 
gives a better guarantee and security to the foreign investment and 
investors. Though, it must be kept in mind that both countries have signed 
numerous Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), including the one in the 
year 2006 between themselves, and so are obligated under these BITs to 
the protected investor of the other contracting parties, who may enforce 
their treaty rights in investment treaty arbitration.  
The Indian government’s general policy towards FDI in its 
country, regardless of the political parties forming the government, has 
been investment and investors’ friendly, and is summed up at the very 
onset under the “intent and objective” chapter of the country’s FDI policy 
as:126        
 
It is the intent and objective of the Government of India to 
attract and promote foreign direct investment in order to 
supplement domestic capital, technology and skills, for 
accelerated economic growth. Foreign Direct Investment, 
as distinguished from portfolio investment, has the 
connotation of establishing a “lasting interest” in an 
enterprise that is resident in an economy other than that of 
the investor.     
 
Though some of the observations, similar to that of Sachdev 
(discussed above) are not discussed here, one of Sweeney’s observations 
must be addressed, which reads:127 
 
Additionally, India should re-evaluate industry specific FDI 
restrictions. Some restrictions may make sense, considering 
political and social differences. But as one commentator 
points out, the specifics of some restrictions suggest a lack 
                                                
126 See FDI Policy, 2014, supra note 125, at ¶  1.1.1.   
127 Sweeney, supra  note 43, at 239-40. 
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of careful deliberation: "Why, for example, does India 
permit 100% FDI in the manufacture of hazardous 
chemicals and industrial explosives, but 74% in telecoms, 
26% in insurance and none at all in supermarkets?" 
 
Though a good suggestion duly supported in this article, the illustration 
cited from a view of a “commentator,” though apparently attractive, is not 
really a cogent one. Permitting “100% FDI in the manufacture of 
hazardous chemicals and industrial explosives” does not mean that 
environmental and safety concerns are given a go by, as there are 
municipal laws to take care of these aspects in domestic companies, 
whether having FDI or not. This submission however does not amount to 
an endorsement of the adequacy of the Indian legal regime in dealing with 
any future tragic mass torts incidents by Multinational Enterprises 
(MNEs), keeping in mind the Bhopal tragedy, despite the current laws 
like, the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991. The lower limits in telecom 
and insurance are because of the grave strategic and security concerns 
involved therein, though they are apparently innocuous when compared to 
the hazardous chemicals industry. In fact, in China the telecom sector 
comes under the ‘restricted list’ in the catalogue and have much lesser 
permissible foreign investment limits. The relevant entry in the 2011 
Catalogue reads: “Tele communication companies: telecommunication 
increment service (the foreign capital less than 50 percent), motion tone 
and data service in basic telecom, interior business and international 
business (the foreign capital less than 35 percent, 49 percent no later than 
11th in December in 2007 is permitted).” 
Notably, under the current 2014 Indian consolidated FDI Policy 
the “telecom services” sector permits 100% FDI, with up to 49% under the 
“automatic route.” In insurance sector too, despite much opposition, the 
Indian government is seeking to enhance FDI limit to 49%.128 As far as the 
comment regarding “supermarkets”,  which pertains to the “multi brand 
retail trading,” is concerned, currently FDI is conditionally permitted in 
India in this sector up to 51%, but it is of course a contentious political and 
policy issue in India. In China, retail industry dealing with distribution of 
“grain, cotton, vegetable oil, sugar, medicines, tobaccos, automobiles, 
crude oil, capital goods for agricultural production” falls within the 
“restricted sector” in the 2011 Catalogue and the additional condition 
imposed on it is that: “Chinese should hold the majority of shares of the 
                                                
128 See Plan to hike FDI in insurance with cap on voting rights, THE HINDU, July 7, 2014, 
http://www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/plan-to-hike-fdi-in-insurance-with-cap-on-
voting-rights/article6186828.ece (last visited Dec 7, 2014); see also Kavita Chowdhury,  
Decks cleared for Insurance bill, if Parliament is not disrupted, BUSINESS STANDARD 
INDIA, December 6, 2014, http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-
policy/decks-cleared-for-insurance-bill-if-parliament-is-not-disrupted-
114120600795_1.html (last visited Dec 7, 2014). 
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multiple shops which have more than 30 branch stores and sale different 
kinds and brands of commodities from multi-suppliers.” The Chinese 
foreign invested retail entities, which would be dealing in the other 
commodities, would presumably be under the “permitted sector.” This 
classification, though seemingly intended to protect indigenous sale of 
certain (presumed) essential commodities, may create unnecessary 
business hindrances for  foreign invested retail enterprises. So, a Retail 
FIE that intends to open a chain of supermarkets in China will have to 
comply with the “restricted list” procedure and conditions. Otherwise, it 
will not be able to sell some of the commonly sold items listed therein, 
including vegetable oil, cotton, and sugar, with possible adverse business 
consequences like losing many prospective customers.     
Before concluding, some of the salient aspects of the Chinese FDI 
Regime that may be considered by the policymakers for incorporation in 
the Indian FDI regime can be succinctly stated as takeaway lessons. The 
quality of the FDI, accompanied with technology transfer, and the 
resultant “spillover effects,” can be important considerations for a 
developing country. As seen above, the Chinese FIE Laws duly emphasize 
upon these aspects. Without violating any international law obligation, 
India can also consider incorporating a similar strategy in its FDI norms in 
order to stress the quality of FDI with resultant spillovers for domestic 
industry. Statutorily laid down time limits for deciding FDI proposal 
applications in India are highly desirable, much like certain FIE regulatory 
approvals under the Chinese regime. Though Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) is generally provided for under India’s Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act of 1996, Indian law and policymakers would do well to 
consider imposing prior mandatory consultations and conciliations in 
order to resolve disputes involving foreign investors and their Indian JV 
partners (or Indian shareholders) before the matter goes for arbitration or 
litigation.  A last suggestion that Indian policymakers should consider is to 
set up dedicated complaint centers for handling complaints by entities with 
FDI and the foreign investors against the administrative officials, as 
discussed above and implemented by the 2006 Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce Measures. Although this article has commented on the possible 
inadequacy of these Chinese Measures, there can be a more efficacious 
mode of dispute settlement machinery for foreign investors and foreign 
invested companies in India, apart from the existing mechanisms under its 
revolutionary Right to Information Act of 2005 and the 2010 Guidelines 
for Redress of Public Grievances.129        
                                                
129 See Compilation of Guidelines for Redress of Public Grievances (Dept. of 
Administrative Reforms & Public Grievances, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances 
& Pensions, GoI), (2010), http://goicharters.nic.in/PGR_Guideline.pdf (last visited Jul 
29, 2014).; see also SINGH AND ARADHE, supra note 102 at 909–28 (discussing secrecy in 
Government of India as well as right to information in India, as well as access to 
information in the U.K., the U.S.A., Australia and New Zealand).  
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Conclusion 
	  
This article has indulged in a comparative study of the Indian and 
Chinese FDI Regimes, drawing lessons for the Indian policymakers and 
offering various suggestions. However, by thoroughly critiquing some of 
the relevant existing literature, this article points out the inadequacies and 
lacunae in the claims and supporting arguments that are generally made to 
praise Chinese FDI regime and to project it as a cause of the huge FDI into 
China. On the other hand, this article discusses the somewhat unfair 
assertions that are made against the Indian FDI regime by those lacking 
appreciation for the constitutional and other differences in the polity of the 
two countries. Sometimes, this is apparently due to the inadequate 
knowledge of the Indian FDI Law and Policy, which this article criticizes 
with proper reasons. However, before indulging in the said comparative 
study, this article begins with an explanation of the salient aspects of 
Chinese legal regime regulating FDI into China, after delineating on the 
Chinese Constitution and its legal system. From the standpoint of an 
Indian author, this preliminary appreciation of the Chinese foreign legal 
system was much needed. Of course, the comparative study portrayed in 
this article may also benefit Chinese policymakers.    
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